Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 31, Issue 1, pp 1–13 | Cite as

Sharing a resource with concave benefits

Original Paper
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:

Abstract

A group of agents are collectively entitled to a perfectly divisible good or resource. They enjoy concave and satiable benefit functions from consuming it. They also value money (transfers). The resource is scarce in the sense that not everybody can consume its satiated consumption level. This paper characterizes the unique (resource and money) allocation that is efficient, incentive-compatible and equal-sharing individual rational. It then discusses its implementation and its link with other axioms.

Keywords

Resource Allocation Transfer Scheme Sharing Rule Feasibility Constraint Walrasian Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Barberà S, Jackson MO (1995) Strategy-proof exchange. Econometrica 63(1):51–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Baumol WJ (1986) Superfairness. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  3. Ching S (1992) A simple characterization of the uniform rule. Econ Lett 40:57–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Foley D (1967) Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Econ Essays 7:45–98Google Scholar
  5. Moulin H (1991) Welfare bounds in the fair division problem. J Econ Theory 54:321–337CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Schmeidler D, Vind K (1972) Fair net trades. Econometrica 40(4):637–642CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Sprumont Y (1991) The division problem with single-peaked preferences: a charateriztion of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 59(2):509–519CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Steinhaus H (1948) The problem of fair division. Econometrica 16:101–104Google Scholar
  9. Thomson W, Varian H (1985) Theories of justice based on symmetry. In: Hurwicz L, Schmeidler D, Sonnenschein H (eds) Social goals and social organizations. Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
  10. Thomson W, Zhou L (1993) Consistent solutions in atomless economies. Econometrica 61(3):575–587CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Varian HR (1974) Equity, envy and efficiency. J Econ Theory 9:63–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Zhou L (1991) Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies. Soc Choice Welf 8:247–254CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Toulouse School of Economics (INRA-LERNA)Université des Sciences, SocialesToulouseFrance

Personalised recommendations