Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 427–446 | Cite as

Moral sentiments and social choice

Original Paper


We examine the implications, for social choice, of individuals having an intrinsic sense of fairness. Taking the viewpoint that social justice reflects the moral attitudes of the constituent members, we analyze the effect of the intensity of the individual sense of fairness on the solution of Nash bargaining over random allocation procedures. We use a stylized model of university admission policies to illustrate our approach. We show that even if social policies are ultimately determined by the bargaining power of the different groups, a society whose members have a common notion of fairness tends to implement fairer admission policies when the intensity of the sense of fairness of individual members increases.


Disagreement Point Allocation Procedure Bargaining Problem Nash Bargaining Solution Admission Policy 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsJohns Hopkins UniversityBaltimoreUSA
  2. 2.The College of Management and Tel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael

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