Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 29, Issue 2, pp 317–331 | Cite as

Citizen candidates under uncertainty

Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper I add uncertainty about the total vote count to a “citizen candidate” model of representative democracy. I show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.California Institute of TechnologyPasadenaUSA

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