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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 29, Issue 2, pp 271–293 | Cite as

The Moulin–Shenker rule

  • Maurice Koster
Original Paper

Abstract

The Moulin–Shenker rule is a non-linear solution concept for solving heterogeneous cost sharing problems. It is the unique continuous rule with the properties scale invariance, bounds on cost shares and self-consistency.

Keywords

Cost Function Marginal Cost Econ Theory Cost Sharing Cost Allocation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Quantitative Economics, Faculty of Economics and EconometricsUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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