Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 29, Issue 2, pp 201–210 | Cite as

An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution

  • Geoffroy de Clippel


I prove that ‘Disagreement Point Convexity’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’ characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of two-player bargaining problems and on the class of smooth bargaining problems. I propose an example to show that these two axioms do not characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of bargaining problems with more than two players. I prove that the other solutions that satisfy these two properties are not lower hemi-continuous. These different results refine the analysis of Chun (Econ Lett 34:311–316, 1990). I also highlight a rather unexpected link with the result of Dagan et al. (Soc Choice Welfare 19:811–823, 2002).


Disagreement Point Pareto Frontier Bargaining Solution Bargaining Problem Nash Bargaining Solution 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsRice UniversityHoustonUSA

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