An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution
- 91 Downloads
I prove that ‘Disagreement Point Convexity’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’ characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of two-player bargaining problems and on the class of smooth bargaining problems. I propose an example to show that these two axioms do not characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of bargaining problems with more than two players. I prove that the other solutions that satisfy these two properties are not lower hemi-continuous. These different results refine the analysis of Chun (Econ Lett 34:311–316, 1990). I also highlight a rather unexpected link with the result of Dagan et al. (Soc Choice Welfare 19:811–823, 2002).
KeywordsDisagreement Point Pareto Frontier Bargaining Solution Bargaining Problem Nash Bargaining Solution
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Harsanyi JC (1959) A bargaining model for the cooperative n-person games. In: Tucker AW, Luce RD (eds) Contributions to the theory of Games IV. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 325–355Google Scholar
- Luce RD, Raiffa H (1957) Games and decisions. Wiley, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- Moulin H (1983) Le choix social utilitariste. Ecole Politechnique DPGoogle Scholar
- Myerson RB (1991) Game theory (analysis of conflict). Harvard University press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Shapley LS (1969) Utility comparison and the theory of games. In: La Decision, Editions du CNRS, pp 251–263Google Scholar
- Thomson W (1994) Cooperative models of bargaining. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 1237–1284Google Scholar