Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 28, Issue 4, pp 529–565

A generalised model of judgment aggregation

Original Paper

Abstract

The new field of judgment aggregation aims to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Judgment aggregation has commonly been studied using classical propositional logic, with a limited expressive power and a problematic representation of conditional statements (“if P then Q ”) as material conditionals. In this methodological paper, I present a simple unified model of judgment aggregation in general logics. I show how many realistic decision problems can be represented in it. This includes decision problems expressed in languages of standard propositional logic, predicate logic (e.g. preference aggregation problems), modal or conditional logics, and some multi-valued or fuzzy logics. I provide a list of simple tools for working with general logics, and I prove impossibility results that generalise earlier theorems.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsUniversity of MaastrichtMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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