Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 111–125 | Cite as

Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms

  • Olivier BochetEmail author
Original Paper


Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin in Rev Econ stud 66: 23–38, 1999) is both necessary and sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. We discuss how to relax the assumption of strict preferences. Next, we examine social choice correspondences with private components. Finally, we apply our method to the issue of voluntary implementation (Jackon and Palfrey in J Econ Theory 98: 1–25, 2001).


Nash Equilibrium Social Choice Function Strong Monotonicity Indivisible Good Social Choice Correspondence 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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