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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 27, Issue 3, pp 571–594 | Cite as

Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims

Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations
  • Simon Gächter
  • Arno Riedl
Original Paper

Abstract

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people’s impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people’s judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the ‘constrained equal-award’ solution.

Keywords

Bargaining Problem Normative Judgment Actual Negotiation Proportional Rule Bankruptcy Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CESifoMunichGermany
  2. 2.IZABonnGermany
  3. 3.School of EconomicsUniversity of NottinghamNottinghamUK
  4. 4.Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business AdministrationUniversity of MaastrichtMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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