Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 26, Issue 3, pp 571–596 | Cite as

Coalition Configurations and the Banzhaf Index

Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, we suppose that players join in coalitions and form a coalition configuration, and we provide a generalization of the normalized Banzhaf-Coleman (1965, 1971) index to this framework.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied Economics IV, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y EmpresarialesBasque Country UniversityBilbaoSpain

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