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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 3–24 | Cite as

Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets

  • Hideo Konishi
  • M. Utku ÜnverEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze capacity manipulation games in hospital-intern markets inspired by the real-life entry-level labor markets for young physicians who seek residencies at hospitals. In a hospital-intern market, the matching is determined by a centralized clearinghouse using the preferences revealed by interns and hospitals and the number of vacant positions revealed by hospitals. We consider a model in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge. Hospitals play a capacity-reporting game. We analyze the equilibria of the game-form under the two most widely used matching rules: hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. We show that (i) there may not be a pure strategy equilibrium in general; and (ii) when a pure strategy equilibrium exists, every hospital weakly prefers this equilibrium outcome to the outcome of any larger capacity profile. Finally, we present conditions on preferences to guarantee the existence of pure strategy equilibria.

Keywords

Econ Theory Stable Match Match Rule Strong Monotonicity Pure Strategy Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBoston CollegeChestnut HillUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsThe University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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