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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 255–261 | Cite as

A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

  • Bettina KlausEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Chun (2001) proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and Ω-continuity. We obtain an alternative characterization by using a weak replication-invariance condition, called duplication-invariance, instead of Ω-continuity. Furthermore, we prove that the equal division lower bound and separability imply no-envy. Using this result, we strengthen one of Chun’s (2001) characterizations of the uniform rule by showing that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, the equal division lower bound, separability, and either Ω-continuity or duplication-invariance.

Keywords

Econ Theory Pareto Optimality Equal Division Fair Allocation Division Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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