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The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

  • Youngsub Chun
Original Paper

Abstract

We investigate the implications of the “separability principle” for the class of problems allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. The separability principle requires that for two problems with the same population, but possibly different social endowments, in which the preferences of agents may change, if there is a subgroup of agents whose preferences are the same and the total amounts awarded to them are the same, then the amount awarded to each agent in the subgroup should be the same. First, we investigate the logical relations between separability and other axioms. As it turns out, consistency implies separability. Then, we present characterizations of the uniform rule on the basis of separability and also on the basis of other axioms.

Keywords

Econ Theory Pareto Optimality Logical Relation Equal Division Separability Principle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsSeoul National UniversitySeoulKorea

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