Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 26, Issue 1, pp 209–215 | Cite as

When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model

  • Richard A. Chisik
  • Robert J. Lemke
Original Paper


It is well known that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in the standard three-candidate spatial voting model when candidates maximize their share of the vote. When all that matters to the candidates is winning the election, however, we show that PSNE do exist. We provide a complete characterization of such equilibria and then extend our results to elections with an arbitrary number of candidates.


Median Voter Vote Share Vote Model Approval Vote Additional Candidate 
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We thank John Boyd, Kevin Dougherty, Julian Edwards, Santanu Roy, and an anonymous referee for the helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics DM-309CFlorida International UniversityMiamiUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics and BusinessLake Forest CollegeLake ForestUSA

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