Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 23, Issue 1, pp 21–57 | Cite as

Equilibrium agenda formation

  • Bhaskar Dutta
  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Michel Le Breton
Article

Abstract.

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known “chaos” theorems.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bhaskar Dutta
    • 1
  • Matthew O. Jackson
    • 2
  • Michel Le Breton
    • 3
  1. 1.University of WarwickEngland
  2. 2.Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences228-77, California Institute of TechnologyCaliforniaUSA
  3. 3.University of Toulouse (GREMAQ and IDEI)ToulouseFrance

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