Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 515–538 | Cite as

Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
  • Tayfun Sönmez
  • M. Utku Ünver
Article

Abstract.

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

Keywords

Market Mechanism Auction Mechanism Division Problem Market Approach 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
    • 1
  • Tayfun Sönmez
    • 2
  • M. Utku Ünver
    • 2
  1. 1.Columbia UniversityDepartment of EconomicsUSA
  2. 2.Koç UniversityDepartment of EconomicsİstanbulTurkey

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