Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 515–538 | Cite as

Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
  • Tayfun Sönmez
  • M. Utku Ünver
Article

Abstract.

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
    • 1
  • Tayfun Sönmez
    • 2
  • M. Utku Ünver
    • 2
  1. 1.Columbia UniversityDepartment of EconomicsUSA
  2. 2.Koç UniversityDepartment of EconomicsİstanbulTurkey

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