Cryptographic implications of Hess' generalized GHS attack

Article

Abstract

A finite field K is said to be weak for elliptic curve cryptography if all instances of the discrete logarithm problem for all elliptic curves over K can be solved in significantly less time than it takes Pollard's rho method to solve the hardest instances. By considering the GHS Weil descent attack, it was previously shown that characteristic two finite fields Open image in new window are weak. In this paper, we examine characteristic two finite fields Open image in new window for weakness under Hess' generalization of the GHS attack. We show that the fields Open image in new window are potentially partially weak in the sense that any instance of the discrete logarithm problem for half of all elliptic curves over Open image in new window , namely those curves E for which Open image in new window is divisible by 4, can likely be solved in significantly less time than it takes Pollard's rho method to solve the hardest instances. We also show that the fields Open image in new window are partially weak, that the fields Open image in new window are potentially weak, and that the fields Open image in new window are potentially partially weak. Finally, we argue that the other fields Open image in new window where N is not divisible by 3, 5, 6, 7 or 8, are not weak under Hess' generalized GHS attack.

Keywords

Elliptic curve cryptography Weil descent Isogenies 

Mathematics Subject Classification (1991)

94A60 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dep. of Combinatorics and OptimizationUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada

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