Economic Theory

, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp 623–636 | Cite as

A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution

  • Anna Bogomolnaia
  • Hervé Moulin
Exposita Notes


All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be preferable to some objects, agents differ on which objects are worse than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial assignment, improves upon (in the Pareto sense) the Random Priority assignment, that randomly orders the agents and offers them successively the most valuable remaining object. We characterize Probabilistic Serial by efficiency in an ordinal sense, and envy-freeness. We characterize it also by ordinal efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals.

Keywords and Phrases: Random assignment, No Envy, Strategyproofness, Priority. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D61, C78, D63. 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anna Bogomolnaia
    • 1
  • Hervé Moulin
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496, USA(e-mail:
  2. 2.Department of Economics, MS 22, P.O. Box 1892, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251-1892,USA (e-mail:

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