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Economic Theory

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 727–733 | Cite as

Rationalizability and the savage axioms

  • Kin Chung Lo
Exposita Notes

Summary.

Suppose there is a finite set of acts defined on a finite state space and a decision maker chooses an act from the set. In this setting, the subjective expected utility model is observationally indistinguishable from all models of preference that satisfy Savage's axiom P3. The result has implications also for rationalizability in strategic games.

Keywords and Phrases: Revealed preference, Rationalizability, Expected utility, Ellsberg Paradox. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D81. 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kin Chung Lo
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, York University, Toronto, Ontario, CANADA M3J 1P3 (e-mail: kclo@yorku.ca)CA

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