Economic Theory

, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 371–391 | Cite as

Sequential decisions with several agents

  • Bruno Bassan
  • Marco Scarsini


We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.

JEL Classification Number: D83. 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruno Bassan
    • 1
  • Marco Scarsini
    • 2
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Matematica, Università“La Sapienza”, I-00185 Roma, ITALYIT
  2. 2.Dipartimento di Scienze, Università D'Annunzio, I-65127 Pescara, ITALYIT

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