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Economic Theory

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 279–296 | Cite as

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

  • Nir Dagan
  • Roberto Serrano
  • Oscar Volij
Research Articles

Summary.

We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible and indivisible goods.

Keywords and Phrases: Finite coalitions and Edgeworthian theory of exchange, Marginal rates of substitution and Jevonsian theory of exchange, Matching and bargaining, Core, Walrasian equilibrium. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D41, C78. 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nir Dagan
    • 1
  • Roberto Serrano
    • 2
  • Oscar Volij
    • 2
  1. 1.Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, Tel-AvivTel-Aviv-YaffoISRAEL
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Brown UniversityProvidenceUSA

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