Information transmission and voting

  • Yingni GuoEmail author
Research Article


I analyze an individual’s incentive to disclose hard evidence in the context of committee voting. A committee consists of three members: one left-leaning, one right-leaning, and the third ex ante unbiased. They decide on whether to pursue a left or right policy by majority rule. One of them has private information about the merits of the policies and can privately send verifiable messages to the others. If the informed member is unbiased, he withholds information to neutralize the other two’s votes when preferences are sufficiently diverse. If the informed member is biased, then the others can better infer his information, knowing that any information favoring his agenda will be shared. In the latter case, because more information is effectively shared, higher social welfare results.


Committee decision making Voting Verifiable disclosure 

JEL Classification

D71 D72 D83 


Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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