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Economic Theory

, Volume 68, Issue 4, pp 887–906 | Cite as

A characterization of random min–max domains and its applications

  • Souvik Roy
  • Soumyarup SadhukhanEmail author
Research Article
  • 99 Downloads

Abstract

We show that a random rule on a top-connected single-peaked domain is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a random min–max rule. As a by-product of this result, it follows that a top-connected single-peaked domain is tops-only for random rules. We further provide a characterization of the random min–max domains.

Keywords

Random min–max rules Single-peaked domains Top-connectedness Uncompromisingness 

JEL Classification

D71 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor for helpful comments. We also thank Gopakumar Achuthankutty, Madhuparna Karmokar, Hans Peters, Arunava Sen, Ton Storcken for useful suggestions and discussion. The usual disclaimer holds.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Economic Research UnitIndian Statistical InstituteKolkataIndia

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