Economic Theory

, Volume 67, Issue 2, pp 421–461 | Cite as

A marriage matching function with flexible spillover and substitution patterns

  • Ismael MourifiéEmail author
Research Article


This paper proposes a new and easy-to-estimate marriage matching function (MMF). I show under minimal conditions the existence of the equilibrium marriage matching distribution associated with the proposed MMF and provide testable conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. This MMF allows more flexible spillover and substitution patterns than the existing MMFs. I show that the static frictionless transferable utility (TU) matching model with peer effects and the dynamic (imperfect) TU marriage matching model both generate MMFs that are each a special case of this proposed MMF. Moreover, I show that the MMF generated by the dynamic TU marriage matching model \(\grave{a}\) la Choo (Econometrica 83(4): 1373–1423, 2015) can be rationalized by a static frictionless TU marriage matching model with peer effects. I show how the estimation of this MMF can be used to estimate peer effect coefficients in a marriage matching model.


Marriage matching function (MMF) Dynamic and static matching model Matching equilibrium Peer effects Imperfect transferable utility 

JEL Subject Classification

D1 C36 C5 C78 J10 



I would like to acknowledge Aloysius Siow for his continued support. Some ideas in this paper were directly motivated from my discussions with him. I have greatly benefited from insightful comments received from Matt Shum. I am grateful to Victor Aguirregabiria, Alfred Galichon, Faisal Ibrahim, Daniel Indacochea, Sonia Jaffé, Marcin Peski, Thomas Russell, and anonymous referees for valuable discussions and comments. I benefited from discussions with participants at OTEAE in NYU. I thank Xiao Lu and Thomas Russell for excellent research assistance.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

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