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The value of a draw

  • Casilda Lasso de la Vega
  • Oscar Volij
Research Article
  • 48 Downloads

Abstract

We model a match as a recursive zero-sum game with three possible outcomes: Player 1 wins, player 2 wins, or there is a draw. We focus on matches whose point games also have three possible outcomes: Player 1 scores the point, player 2 scores the point, or the point is drawn in which case the point game is repeated. We show that a value of a draw can be attached to each state so that an easily computed stationary equilibrium exists in which players’ strategies can be described as minimax behavior in the point games induced by these values.

Keywords

Matches Stochastic games Recursive games Draws 

JEL Classification

C72 C73 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Oscar Volij thanks the Department of Foundations of Economics Analysis I at the University of the Basque Country for its kind hospitality. This paper was partly written during his stay there.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of the Basque CountryBilbaoSpain
  2. 2.Ben-Gurion University of the NegevBeer shevaIsrael

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