Economic Theory

, Volume 67, Issue 2, pp 363–378 | Cite as

The effect of meeting rates on matching outcomes

  • Sonia JaffeEmail author
  • Simon Weber
Research Article


We extend the classic matching model of Choo and Siow (J Polit Econ 114(1):175–201, 2006) to allow for the possibility that the rate at which potential partners meet affects their probability of matching. We investigate the implications for the levels and supermodularity of the estimated match surplus.


Matching markets Assortative matching Matching function Marriage markets 

JEL Classification

C78 J12 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ChicagoChicagoUSA
  2. 2.Becker Friedman InstituteUniversity of ChicagoChicagoUSA

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