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Economic Theory

, Volume 66, Issue 3, pp 747–761 | Cite as

Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes

  • Eddie Dekel
  • Ady Pauzner
Research Article

Abstract

This paper considers a class of two-player symmetric games of incomplete information with strategic substitutes. First, we provide sufficient conditions under which there is either a unique equilibrium which is stable (in the sense of best-reply dynamics) and symmetric or a unique (up to permutations) asymmetric equilibrium that is stable (together with an unstable symmetric equilibrium). Thus, (i) there is always a unique stable equilibrium, (ii) it is either symmetric or asymmetric, and hence, (iii) a very simple local condition—stability of the symmetric equilibrium (i.e., the slope of the best-response function at the symmetric equilibrium)—identifies which case applies. Using this, we provide a very simple sufficient condition on primitives for when the unique stable equilibrium is asymmetric (and similarly for when it is symmetric). Finally, we show that the conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness described above also yield novel comparative statics results for this class of games.

Keywords

Uniqueness of equilibrium Stability Symmetry breaking Monotone comparative statics Strategic substitutes 

JEL Classification

C72 C78 D82 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Northwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA
  2. 2.Tel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael
  3. 3.The Eitan Berglas School of EconomicsTel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael

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