A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations
We present a new model for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems to allow planners to identify how many agents merge. Under this new framework, in contrast to the traditional model, there are rules that satisfy the property of Merge-proofness. Furthermore, strengthening this property and adding some others, such as Population Monotonicity and Solidarity, makes it possible to define a unique rule that coincides with the weighted Shapley value of an associated cost game.
KeywordsMinimum cost spanning tree problems Cost sharing Core Selection Cost Monotonicity Merge-proofness Weighted Shapley value
JEL ClassificationC71 D61 D63 D7
We are grateful to Gustavo Bergantiños, Anna Bogomolnaia and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Usual disclaimer applies. We also thank participants at several seminars and conferences at U. Vigo, MINES ParisTech, Technical University of Lisbon, U. Barcelona, U. York, U. Granada, Boston College and U.P. Navarra.
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