Economic Theory

, Volume 57, Issue 2, pp 279–302 | Cite as

Representation of constitutions under incomplete information

  • Bezalel PelegEmail author
  • Shmuel Zamir
Research Article


We model constitutions by effectivity functions. We assume that the constitution is common knowledge among the members of the society. However, the preferences of the citizens are private information. We investigate whether there exist decision schemes (i.e., functions that map profiles of (dichotomous) preferences on the set of outcomes to lotteries on the set of social states), with the following properties: (i) The distribution of power induced by the decision scheme is identical to the effectivity function under consideration; and (ii) the (incomplete information) game associated with the decision scheme has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. If the effectivity function is monotonic and superadditive, then we find a class of decision schemes with the foregoing properties.


Effectivity function Incomplete information Decision scheme Bayesian Nash equilibrium 

JEL Classification

C62 C70 D82 



We are indebted to three anonymous referees for their helpful comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for the Study of RationalityThe Hebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael

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