# Bayesian and consistent assessments

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## Abstract

In a *Bayesian assessment*, beliefs are computed from the strategy profile applying Bayes rule at positive probability information sets. A *consistent assessment* is the limit point of a sequence of completely mixed Bayesian assessments. We characterize the set of extensive forms for which the sets of Bayesian and consistent assessments coincide. As an illustration of the results, we characterize consistency in some multi-period games with simultaneous actions.

## Keywords

Bayesian assessments Consistent assessments Sequential equilibrium Extensive forms## JEL Classification

C62 C72 D80## References

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