Economic Theory

, Volume 55, Issue 3, pp 601–617 | Cite as

Bayesian and consistent assessments

  • Carlos PimientaEmail author
Research Article


In a Bayesian assessment, beliefs are computed from the strategy profile applying Bayes rule at positive probability information sets. A consistent assessment is the limit point of a sequence of completely mixed Bayesian assessments. We characterize the set of extensive forms for which the sets of Bayesian and consistent assessments coincide. As an illustration of the results, we characterize consistency in some multi-period games with simultaneous actions.


Bayesian assessments Consistent assessments Sequential equilibrium Extensive forms 

JEL Classification

C62 C72 D80 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsThe University of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

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