Economic Theory

, Volume 52, Issue 2, pp 531–564 | Cite as

Civic duty and political advertising

Research Article


Should voter awareness policies and get-out-the-vote movements be promoted? This paper addresses the question using a model of political advertising that incorporates both the mobilization and the persuasion aspects of advertising. We characterize the equilibrium and conduct comparative statics analysis allowing evaluation of the effect of voter awareness policies or the activity of get-out-the-vote movements on political advertising and the information aggregated by the electoral outcome. We find that such policies or movements may lead to either an increase or a decrease in political advertising as well as in the probability that the candidate preferred by a majority of (all informed) citizens is elected.


Civic duty Political advertising Expressive-voting Voter awareness policies 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversité du Québec à Montréal and CIRPÉEMontréalCanada

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