General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
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We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility.
KeywordsGeneral equilibrium Differential information Verifiability Uncertain delivery Lists of bundles Rational behavior
JEL ClassificationC62 D51 D82
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