The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
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We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. We consider two interesting cases of this problem: (1) the supply of each object is exactly one; and (2) the supply of an object may be greater than one. Our central requirements are strategy-proofness and ex post fairness. We propose a particular rule satisfying strategy-proofness and no-envy (as well as equal treatment of equals). For the first case, it Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals. For the second case, it Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying strategy-proofness and no-envy.
KeywordsIndivisible goods Strategy-proofness Fairness No-envy
JEL ClassificationC71 C78 D71 D78
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