Economic Theory

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 457–477 | Cite as

Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

  • Christopher J. Tyson
Research Article


We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. Our analysis uses a backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the authority to force one of the available alternatives. Iterative dominance then implies that the alternative characterized in this way will be agreed upon at the outset—or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached.


Backward induction Coalition Core Weak dominance 

JEL Classification

C78 D71 D74 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsQueen Mary University of LondonLondonUK

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