Economic Theory

, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp 1–7 | Cite as

Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium

  • Bernhard von StengelEmail author


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsLondon School of EconomicsLondonUK

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