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Economic Theory

, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp 491–494 | Cite as

A remark on the measurability of large games

  • Guilherme Carmona
Exposita Note

Abstract

A game with a continuum of players is described by a function assigning payoff functions to players and satisfying some measurability properties. In this note we establish the equivalence between several measurability assumptions that have been made in the literature.

Keywords

Games with a continuum of players Measurability 

JEL Classification

C72 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculdade de EconomiaUniversidade Nova de LisboaLisboaPortugal

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