Economic Theory

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 327–336 | Cite as

Differentiating ambiguity: an expository note

Exposita Note

Abstract

Ghirardato et al. J Econ Theory 118:133–173, 2004 propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker’s reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. This note presents some examples which illustrate their results.

Keywords

Ambiguity Multiple priors Invariant biseparable preferences Hurwicz preferences 

JEL Classification Number

D81 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of HeidelbergHeidelbergGermany
  2. 2.Department of Economics-MS 22Rice UniversityHoustonUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ExeterExeterUK

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