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Economic Theory

, Volume 35, Issue 3, pp 539–553 | Cite as

Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection

  • Carlos González Pimienta
  • Cristian M. Litan
Research Article

Abstract

We characterize the class of finite extensive forms for which the sets of Subgame Perfect and Sequential equilibrium strategy profiles coincide for any possible payoff function. In addition, we identify the class of finite extensive forms for which the outcomes induced by these two solution concepts coincide.

Keywords

Extensive form Sequential equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium 

JEL Classification Number

C72 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carlos González Pimienta
    • 1
    • 2
  • Cristian M. Litan
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversidad Carlos III de MadridGetafe (Madrid)Spain
  2. 2.School of EconomicsUniversity of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

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