Dynamic clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However, clock auctions require congregating bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces inefficiencies of its own given the time cost of congregating bidders. In this experiment we explore the effects of removing these inefficiencies through survival auctions—a multi-round sealed-bid auction which is theoretically isomorphic to the dynamic clock auction with drop-out information.
KeywordsSurvival auction Vickrey auction Ausubel auction Multi-unit demand auction
JEL Classification NumbersD44 D78 C92
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