Economic Theory

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 103–119 | Cite as

Survival auctions



Dynamic clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However, clock auctions require congregating bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces inefficiencies of its own given the time cost of congregating bidders. In this experiment we explore the effects of removing these inefficiencies through survival auctions—a multi-round sealed-bid auction which is theoretically isomorphic to the dynamic clock auction with drop-out information.


Survival auction Vickrey auction Ausubel auction Multi-unit demand auction 

JEL Classification Numbers

D44 D78 C92 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • John H. Kagel
    • 1
  • Svetlana Pevnitskaya
    • 2
  • Lixin Ye
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsThe Ohio State UniversityColumbusUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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