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Economic Theory

, Volume 33, Issue 2, pp 285–309 | Cite as

Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning

  • Christopher P. Chambers
Research Article

Abstract

We study a spatial model of political competition in which potential candidates need a fixed amount of money from lobbies to enter an election. We show that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in which lobbies finance candidates whose policies they prefer among the set of entrants coincides with the set of Nash equilibria with weakly less than two entering candidates. Fixing lobbies’ preferences, if the total amount of money held by lobbies is finite, there exists some minimal distance between the two candidates’ positions. This minimal distance is a bound for all such Nash equilibria and is independent of the distribution of voters’ preferences.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Ideal Point Prefer Policy Vote Share Political Competition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77California Institute of TechnologyPasadenaUSA

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