Economic Theory

, Volume 32, Issue 3, pp 575–578

Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria

Exposita Note

Abstract

We show that every N-player K1  ×  ...  ×  KN game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least \(\prod_{i=1}^{N} K_i -1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} K_i (K_i -1)\) zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K  ×  ...  ×  K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games.

Keywords

Correlated equilibrium Finite games 

JEL Classification Number

C72 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departament d’Economia i EmpresaUniversitat Pompeu FabraBarcelonaSpain
  2. 2.ICREA and Departament d’Economia i EmpresaUniversitat Pompeu FabraBarcelonaSpain

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