Economic Theory

, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 411–416 | Cite as

Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]

Exposita Note

Abstract

Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented – and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.”

Keywords

Random order mechanism Stability Two-sided matching 

JEL Classification Number

C78 

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References

  1. Knuth D.E. Marriages Stables. Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université Montréal (1978)Google Scholar
  2. Ma J. (1996) On randomized matching mechanisms. Econ. Theory 8, 377–381Google Scholar
  3. Roth A.E., Vande Vate J.H. (1990) Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica 58, 1475–1480CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)Campus UABBellaterra (Barcelona)Spain

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