Children Crying at Birthday Parties. Why?
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We consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous one-dimensional continuum whose endpoints are topologically identified. Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical call. We study the existence of rules satisfying requirements of efficiency, fairness (no-envy), and immunity to misrepresentation of preferences (strategy-proofness).
KeywordsCake division No-envy Strategy-proofness
JEL Classification NumbersD63 D70
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