Economic Theory

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 561–574 | Cite as

Consistent House Allocation

  • Lars Ehlers
  • Bettina KlausEmail author
Open Access
Research Article


In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except – maybe – for up to three agents in each object’s priority ordering.


Indivisible objects Priority structure Consistency Strategy-proofness 

JEL Classification Numbers

D63 D70 


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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQUniversité de MontréalMontréalCanada
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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