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Economic Theory

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 575–586 | Cite as

Excess Entry in the Absence of Scale Economies

  • Arghya Ghosh
  • Souresh Saha
Exposita Note

Abstract

It is well-known that with free entry, more firms than is socially optimal typically enter provided there are economies of scale. This paper investigates the possibility of excess entry in the absence of scale economies

Keywords

Free entry Economies of scale Business-stealing Excess entry Cournot Stackelberg 

JEL Classification Numbers

L51 L52 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsUniversity of New South WalesSydneyAustralia
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsThe National University of SingaporeSingaporeSingapore

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