Economic Theory

, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 255–263 | Cite as

Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution

  • Walter Trockel


Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results reconfirm the Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish the same speed of convergence as is known from Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975) for replicated pure exchange economies and for regular purely competitive sequences of economies, respectively.

Keywords and Phrases:

Nash-solution Core convergence Equivalence theorem. 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)Bielefeld UniversityBielefeldGERMANY

Personalised recommendations