Economic Theory

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 33–44 | Cite as

Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

  • Federico Echenique
Research Article


The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.

Keywords and Phrases: Supermodular games, Strategic complementarities, Mixed strategy equilibria, Learning. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73. 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Federico Echenique
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Miñones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA AR

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