Economic Theory

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 211–217 | Cite as

On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions

  • Hideki Mizukami
Exposita Note

Summary.

We consider the problem of choosing one point in a set of alternatives when monetary transfers are possible. In this context, Schummer (2000) shows that a social choice function must be a constant function if manipulation through bribes is ruled out. But he requires two kinds of domain-richness conditions. One is either smooth connectedness or the finiteness of the set of alternatives and the other is monotonical closedness. However, dispensing with the former condition, we alternatively prove the same result under a weaker condition than monotonical closedness.

Keywords and Phrases: Social choice, Strategy-proofness, Bribe-proofness, Transferable utility, Constancy. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D71, H40. 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hideki Mizukami
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of Economics and Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, JAPAN (e-mail: mizukami@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp) JP

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