Advertisement

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 211–224 | Cite as

Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings

  • Burkhard Hehenkamp
  • Cheng-Zhong Qin
  • Charles Stuart
Article

Abstract.

We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium.

Key words: Oligopoly Bertrand equilibrium Cournot equilibrium Natural selection Evolutionary games 
JEL-classification: D43; L13; C72 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Burkhard Hehenkamp
    • 1
  • Cheng-Zhong Qin
    • 2
  • Charles Stuart
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics, University of Dortmund, D-44221 Dortmund, Germany (e-mail: mik-buhe@wiso.uni-dortmund.de)DE
  2. 2.Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA (e-mail: qin@econ.ucsb.edu; stuart@econ.ucsb.edu)US

Personalised recommendations