Journal of Evolutionary Economics

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 15–43 | Cite as

On economic applications of evolutionary game theory

  • Daniel Friedman


Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.

Key words: Evolutionary games Adjustment dynamics ESS Evolutionary equilibrium 
JEL-classification: B25; C62; C72; C73 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Friedman
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, University of California at Santa Cruz, 212 Social Sciences I, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USAUS

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