Journal of Evolutionary Economics

, Volume 16, Issue 1–2, pp 189–206 | Cite as

Social and technological efficiency of patent systems

REGULAR ARTICLE

Abstract

This article develops an evolutionary model of industry dynamics in order to carry out a richer theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. The first results obtained in our article are rather consistent with the anti-patent arguments and do not favor the case for a stronger patent system: higher social welfare and technical progress are observed in our model in industries with milder patent systems (lower patent height and patent life).

Keywords

Innovation Technical progress Patent system Intellectual property rights (IPR) Technology policy 

JEL Classification

O3 O34 L52 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LENUniversité de NantesNantesFrance
  2. 2.E3i, IFReDE-GRESUniversité Montesquieu Bordeaux IVPessacFrance

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